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 Climate change is a controversial topic. Most scientists believe climate change is 
occurring, but a large segment of the population disagrees, and disbelievers are more likely to be 
conservative. As such, researchers have examined many ways to increase belief in human caused 
climate change, and there has been some disagreement regarding the best way to do so. The 
purpose of this study is to examine how message source characteristics, recipient political 
ideology, and recipient political and scientific knowledge interact to predict reception of 
persuasive messages about climate change, and perhaps resolve some disagreement in the 
literature. Participants were first asked about their political affiliation, were then asked science 
and political questions to assess knowledge, and about their political affiliation. They were also 
asked questions regarding their belief in climate change, and their belief that it is human caused. 
They were randomly assigned to see a message from a source who matched their political 
ideology (a source match) or one that did not (a mismatch); messages included photos, bios, and 
a quote about climate change. We hypothesized that we would find source matching effects, such 
that conservative participants would be more persuaded by military, business, and religious 
sources, and that liberal participants would be more persuaded by scientists and celebrities. We 
also expected that effects of source expertise and source match would be greatest for high-
knowledge conservative participants, who would be especially skeptical of messages about 
climate change.  However, our messages did not seem to influence participants’ climate change 
worry at all. More specifically, we expected that messages from conservative sources with high 
perceived expertise would have the greatest positive impact on climate-change belief for high 
knowledge participants. Instead, we found that participant characteristics (i.e., political ideology 
and political/scientific knowledge) interacted to predict climate change worry and 
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environmentally-friendly behavioral intentions, such that liberals were more worried and had 
greater behavioral intentions than conservatives, and this effect was stronger when knowledge 




Climate change is a heavily debated, highly politicized topic on which many Americans 
disagree. Human-caused climate change is occurring; it is important that people believe it is 
happening and is human-caused, and it is more important that they are willing to do something 
about it (Leiserowitz, 2016). With recent events, such as the drought and fires in California, and 
changing environmental policies, the controversial topic of climate change, and what to do about 
it, has become increasingly important.   
Although the percentages of Americans who believe climate change is occurring, who 
believe that it is human caused, and who trust climate scientists has increased over time, there is 
still a significant proportion of people that do not believe this or trust climate 
scientists.  According to studies conducted at Yale, 25% of Americans do not trust climate 
scientists, only a little over half of Americans find climate change worrisome, 46% do not 
believe that it is human caused, and 30% do not believe that climate change is happening at all 
(Leiserowitz, 2012).   
Many studies (e.g., Bolsen & Druckman, 2016; Kahan, 2013; van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, Feinberg & Maibach, 2015) have been conducted to find the best way to 
communicate about climate change in order to convince people that it is occurring and to take 
action to reduce it. Research has indicated that simple, numeric statements (eg. “97% of climate 
scientists have concluded that human-caused change is happening”) are one effective means of 
communicating climate change information (Myers, Maibach, Peters, & Leiserowitz, 2015; van 
der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg & Maibach, 2014). In addition, telling people that there is 
scientific consensus on climate change increases belief in the consensus on climate change. For 
example, participants presented with the statement “97% of climate scientists have concluded 
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that climate change is happening,” show increased estimates of the consensus (van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, Feinberg & Maibach, 2015). In addition, presenting people with information that is 
easy to understand and process is effective in terms in increasing the estimate of human-caused 
climate change (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg & Maibach, 2015).  
Other research suggests that opinionated leaders may be effective for communicating 
science. In particular, people may be more inclined to accept scientific information from people 
who match their political groups, especially from an opinionated leader (Nisbet & Kotcher, 
2009). Research conducted on the effects of sources of persuasive messages supports the idea 
that group leaders may be particularly effective sources. First, source characteristics are very 
important to impacting attitudes (Ohanian, 1990). Specifically, three dimensions: attractiveness 
(i.e., how physically attractive the source is, or how much they are liked by the recipient), 
trustworthiness (i.e., how sincere or concerned with the recipient the source seems), and 
expertise (i.e., how much knowledge and experience the source has about the topic), affect how 
credible a source is to participants, which in turn determines how much they are persuaded by 
that source (Ohanian, 1990).  
People are especially likely to be attracted to, and more influenced by, people who have 
similar attitudes to them (e.g., Hendrick & Page, 1970), or who share an ingroup identity, like 
belonging to the same university (e.g., Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion, 1990; for review see 
Fleming & Petty, 2000). In the case of political in-groups, sources from the same political party 
will have shared attitudes and a shared ingroup identity. Furthermore, people may be especially 
inclined to trust climate change information if it comes from a source that they consider 
trustworthy and that is high in expertise, and they may be more inclined to think an in-group 
member is trustworthy and expert (Ohanian, 1990). 
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Other research has studied which sources political parties tend to find more trustworthy. 
Studies by Kahan et al. conducted a study in which they presented participants with information 
regarding the controversial HPV vaccine (Kahan et al., 2010). Participants were presented with 
the information from a fake source who was either “culturally identifiable” or not, meaning if the 
source matched their in-group or did not (Kahan et al., 2010). The participants were presented 
with a photograph of the source, and a list of books that the source wrote. The photographs and 
books either matched a more “conservative” ideology or a “liberal” ideology, as perceived by 
participants. They found that the level of polarizing that occurred was very sensitive to whether 
or not the identity of the source matched the identity of the participant (Kahan et al, 2010).  
In addition, people are motivated to reason in ways that allow them to fit within their in-
group (Bolsen & Druckman, 2016), and some research suggests people are more likely to 
process information more from ingroup sources than from outgroup sources (see Flemming & 
Petty, 2000). Indeed, the role of ingroup identity may be particularly important, as is seen in the 
theory of referent emotional influence (e.g., Turner, 1991). This theory states that people’s 
confidence in their own opinions depends on whether their ingroup shares the same views. If 
their views do not fit with those of their ingroup, people will often adjust their views accordingly 
to better align with their group (e.g., as a topic becomes politicized, people may change their 
beliefs to align with their party).  
In the case of climate change, even when shown the consensus, people may dismiss the 
information if it does not fit their political ideology, and instead reject scientists as outgroup 
members. Consistent with this possibility, Democrats are more likely to trust information from 
climate scientists, who tend to be liberal, than Republicans are (Hamilton, 2014). Of course, both 
liberals’ and conservatives’ desire to fit within their political groups can motivate biased 
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reasoning (Bolsen & Druckman, 2016), but current conservative thinking is critical of climate 
change. However, based on prior research (e.g., Nisbett & Kotcher, 1999), a message from a 
Republican or someone who fits in the Republican group may cause change in climate change 
beliefs more than stereotypically liberal scientists do. Taken together, research on persuasive 
sources in general and climate change belief in particular support the hypothesis that source 
match can affect trust and be particularly important for influencing climate change beliefs. 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Sources will be trusted more or less depending on participant’s party 
identification (Pilot study) 
Hypothesis H1b (H1b): Sources that match a participant’s party identification will be more 
persuasive (Main study) 
However, researchers have yet to study which methods of communication, along with 
source matching, most increase belief in climate change across political ideology. In fact, there is 
disagreement in the literature regarding the best way to communicate scientific information, 
particularly climate change information, to members of different political parties.  
Some researchers (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg & Maibach, 2015) believe that 
presenting participants with scientific information will increase their belief in climate change. In 
their gateway belief model, Van der Linden and colleagues’ (2015) posit that if people are 
presented with expert consensus, they are likely to change their beliefs, and that these beliefs 
serve as a gateway to other outcomes: they may be more inclined to support a certain cause, 
develop a favorable opinion, or change their behavior. In this case, if people are informed of the 
scientific consensus around climate change (e.g., “97% of climate scientists have concluded that 
climate change is happening”), people should change their estimates of how many scientists 
believe in it. Then, people should change their beliefs in human caused climate change, worry 
8 
 
more about the environment, and increase support for action to reduce climate change. Van der 
Linden and colleagues (2014) tested this model using climate change beliefs.  They presented 
participants information about the scientific consensus on climate change in various formats (i.e., 
pie charts, metaphors, or simply stating it). They found that both pie charts and simple statements 
were effective in increasing consensus beliefs from pretest to posttest.  
Other researchers (Kahan, 2015) have found that changing beliefs may not be as simple 
as presenting a scientific consensus pie chart. Instead, due to motivated reasoning, some people 
may resist attempts to change their beliefs or reject them altogether. Motivated reasoning is the 
tendency for people to process information in ways that support existing beliefs or desired 
conclusions (Kunda, 1990). As Kunda (1990) reviews, people tend to search for information that 
allows them to justify their existing beliefs and avoid cognitive dissonance (i.e., discomfort 
experienced when information does not match previous beliefs); as a result, they tend to be 
biased. They also tend to search for or uncritically accept information that will support what they 
want to believe in. In the case of climate change, conservatives unconsciously or consciously 
look for information that denies climate change is human caused, and may mistrust scientists or 
more carefully scrutinize evidence of anthropogenic climate change. And liberals may 
uncritically accept that same evidence because it supports their beliefs. Indeed, despite scientific 
consensus on climate change, the discrepancy between liberals’ and conservatives’ climate 
change beliefs and concern perseveres (Funk & Kennedy, 2016).   
Motivated reasoning is more likely when people engage in cognitive reflection (i.e., 
thinking and reasoning about something; Kahan, 2013) and when people have more relevant 
knowledge. Research has shown that, due to motivated reasoning, people tend to unconsciously 
search for information that allows them to stay with their in-group (Kahan, 2015). One study 
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looked at politically motivated reasoning regarding the scientific consensus on climate change 
(Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman, 2011). In this study, participants were shown photos and CVs 
of well-regarded scientists. The participants were asked to rank to what degree they thought this 
person was an expert in climate change. How the participants rated the expertise of the source 
was highly correlated with whether or not the position of the scientist matched their own views. 
Therefore, if presented science is inconsistent with people’s beliefs and the beliefs of their 
political party, they may be less inclined to trust it and to be persuaded by it (Kahan, 2015). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Bolsen and Druckman (2016) asked participants to rate the 
extent to which they believed climate change was human caused versus a result of Earth’s 
natural changes. They then presented some of the participants with information on the scientific 
consensus. They also measured group identity and knowledge of the participants, and support for 
three environmentally-friendly policies. The findings among low knowledge participants were 
consistent with the gateway belief model instead (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg & 
Maibach, 2015): Specifically, low knowledge people of either party were the most likely to be 
persuaded by the consensus message. However, they found that partisan identity mattered for 
those with high knowledge. There was a divide between high- knowledge Democrats and high-
knowledge Republicans. Specifically, high- knowledge Democrats already believed in climate 
change and thus did not change much, they were still influenced by the consensus message. 
However, and critically, high-knowledge Republicans rejected consensus information and even 
showed a nonsignificant trend towards believing in climate change less after receiving consensus 
information, which suggests that they were counter-arguing the message and engaging in 
motivated processing. This finding that high-knowledge Republicans were more likely to engage 
in motivated reasoning (in the case of climate change) is inconsistent with van der Linden, 
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Leiserowitz, Feinberg and Maibach’s (2015) gateway belief model, and suggests that it may be 
harder to change strongly held beliefs than previously hypothesized at least among people with 
high knowledge. 
As mentioned above, one way of reducing the motivation to counter-argue the message 
among highly knowledgeable Republicans could be to present climate change information from a 
source that Republicans will agree with and allows them to simultaneously believe in climate 
change and feel identified with their political in group. Bolson’s (2016) results suggest that 
source may not matter much (or at least not differentially) for low knowledge participants of 
either party (because they were already influenced by consensus information and did not counter 
argue in the first place) or for high knowledge Democrats who already strongly believe in 
anthropogenic climate change. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Knowledge and political ideology will interact such that high knowledge 
Republicans will show the greatest effect of a matching message source. (Main study) 
To test these hypotheses, we presented participants multiple sources and quotes in a pilot 
study.  This allowed us to determine how trustworthy and knowledgeable Republican and 
Democrat participants found the different sources and to select sources for the primary study. In 
the main study, we randomly presented participants with a climate change message from a 
source that either matched or mismatched their political ideology and was high or low in 
expertise based on the pilot study findings. Following the climate change message, we asked 
them about their belief in climate change and their willingness to take action.  
Pilot study 
We manipulated source information in a pretest/posttest design in order to understand how 
political affiliation and knowledge might influence climate change persuasion and to select 
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materials for the main study. Our goal was to select actual public figures whose biographies and 
photographs produce the largest differences in perceptions of trustworthiness between 
Republicans and Democrats and allowed us choose quotes that produced the smallest differences 
in message persuasiveness between Republicans and Democrats (thus holding belief in message 
content constant). We also wanted to select one high perceived expertise and one low perceived 
expertise for both Republicans and Democrats. We found the mean ratings of perceived 
trustworthiness and expertise for each source. We then subtracted the Republican perceived 
trustworthiness mean from the Democrat perceived trustworthiness mean. This allowed us to 
select those with the biggest differences in perceived trustworthiness for each group. We then 
needed to select one high and one low perceived expertise source that Democrats trusted more, 
and that Republicans trusted more. If successful, we could be reasonably sure that any observed 
differences in the main study would be due to the information source and not the message. 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants from this study were recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). Of the 224 participants invited to the study from an earlier prescreening session, 
150 completed the study; 69 Democrats and 33 Republicans were used in these analyses 
(moderates, n=48, were excluded for simplicity during the analysis.).   
Procedure 
In October 2018, a larger group of Amazon MTurk participants completed a baseline 
questionnaire, which included questions on their demographics (political party, age sex, income, 
education, etc.) and climate change worry. Other materials unrelated to these were also included. 
The climate change worry questions were also used in the main study. In late December 2017, a 
subset of these participants (n=150 as indicated above) completed the pilot study. In the pilot 
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study, participants rated eleven quotes from eleven different sources and then they rated 
biographical sketches of the sources. There were 5 “conservative” sources and quotes (i.e., from 
sources that we believed would appeal to Republicans) and 6 “liberal” sources and quotes (i.e., 
from sources we believed would appeal to Democrats). The quotes and sources were presented 
randomly and separately, so participants did not know that the quotes came from the sources. 
Materials 
Quotes. The quotes chosen described the potential dangers of climate change, as well as 
arguments that it is occurring. The full list of quotes is included in Appendix A. When presented 
with the quotes, participants were asked “how persuasive do you find this statement?” and “how 
much does this quote make you worry about climate change?” on a scale from 1 (none at all) to 5 
(a great deal). The two questions were highly correlated (r=.86) and were combined into a single 
measure for analysis. 
Source information. The biographies included a color picture of the source and information on 
the source’s education, accomplishments, and careers (see Appendix A). We selected 5 sources 
that should appeal to conservatives: military personnel, a CEO, and a religious figure and 6 
sources that should appeal to liberals: climate scientists, celebrity scientists, and a celebrity actor. 
When presented with the sources, participants were asked to rank the perceived expertise and 




We conducted general linear model analyses (GLM) of participants’ ratings of quotes, 
perceived trustworthiness of sources, and perceived source expertise. Each analysis included 
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participant’s political ideology and source as predictors. This allowed us to model the ratings as 
repeated measures within participants and look for differences between stimuli depending on 
participant political ideology, as well as to see whether or not there were political ideology 
differences on a particular quote or source. We were looking to find sources that showed 
differences in trustworthiness based on ideology. However, we also wanted sources whose 
quotes did not show differences in ideology, so we were mainly interested in pairwise 
comparisons than omnibus results. 
Ratings of Quotes  
Across all eleven quotes, Republicans reported less persuasiveness and worry to the 
quotes (M=2.60, se=.21) than Democrats (M=3.73, se=0.10, b=1.12, se=0.28, Wald χ²=16.44, 
p<.001). This effect of participant ideology on the quote ratings did not depend on which quote it 
was (p> .73). Indeed, we found the same ideology effect for each individual quote: Democrats 
rated each quote higher than Republicans, by .82 to 1.33 points (on a five point scale). For 
average ratings of quotes for each party, see Figure 1, and for means and significance tests for 
each quote by party, see Table 1. Thus, we will not be able to have message persuasiveness 
constant across political ideology, but will try to minimize it. 
Perceived Trustworthiness of Sources  
Trustworthiness and expertise were examined separately. We found that the sources were 
trusted differently (Wald χ²(10)= 267.5, p<.001), and overall trust was not significantly higher 
for Democrats than Republicans (Wald χ²(1)= 3.58, p=.059). As expected, and consistent with 
H1a, there was an interaction between source and political party (Wald- χ² (10)= 71.50, p<.001), 
which indicated that political party had a different effect on trustworthiness depending on source, 
see Figure 2. We next looked to see which sources were differentially trusted by Republicans vs. 
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Democrats. Generally, the “conservative” sources were trusted more by Republicans than 
Democrats, other than Admiral Witley, who was trusted equally, and Pope Francis, who was 
unexpectedly trusted more by Democrats than Republicans. Similarly, the “liberal” sources were 
trusted more by Democrats (see Table 1 for detailed significance tests between parties).  
Perceived expertise of sources  
We found that the sources differed in perceived expertise (Wald χ²(10)= 385.83, p<.001). 
Perceived expertise ratings were not significantly higher for Democrats than Republicans (Wald 
χ²(1)= 1.348, p=.246). Unexpectedly, there was an interaction between source and political party 
(Wald- χ² (10)= 37.068, p<.001), which indicated that political party had a different effect on 
perceived expertise depending on source (see Figure 3). Generally, scientists were rated as 
higher in expertise than objectively non-expert sources like the Pope and DeCaprio. However, 
Democrats rated Pope Francis, Stephen Hawking and Bill Nye as significantly more expert than 
Republicans (see Table 1).  
Selection of source-quote pairs  
We wanted to find two sources that Democrats trusted more (one each low and high in 
expertise), and two sources that Republicans trusted more (again, one each low and high in 
expertise). We also wanted the differences in perceived expertise to be as small as possible 
between Republicans and Democrats, but this was difficult because trust and expertise were 
correlated and there were differences in perceived expertise by party. We wanted to ensure that 
there was a significant difference between the perceived trustworthiness of the sources for 
Republicans and Democrats. Therefore, if a source was perceived as highly trustworthy by both, 
we could not select them. We also needed to select sources whose quotes were equally 
persuasive and worry inducing.  
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We chose Stephen Hawking as the high expertise “liberal” source because there was a 
significant effect of political party on trustworthiness, such that Democrats rated him higher 
(M=4.48, se=0.09) than Republicans (M=3.64, se=0.24), Wald χ²(1)=10.63, p=.001, and he was 
perceived as high in expertise (M=4.23, se=.12); significantly higher in expertise than all other 
sources except for Thompson and Tyson, as indicated by pairwise comparisons (significant 
differences ranged from .29 to 1.65). The choice is imperfect, however, as Democrats did rate 
him as significantly more expert (M=4.49, se=.10) than Republicans (M=3.97, se=.20), Wald 
χ²(1)=5.49, p=.02.  
Interestingly, although Pope Francis was intended to be a “conservative” source, he was 
significantly more trusted by Democrats (M=3.91, se=.143) than Republicans (M=2.94, se=.267), 
Wald χ²= 10.306, p=.001. Both Republicans (M=2.30, se=.225) and Democrats (M=2.86, 
se=.145) perceived him as low in expertise, although Democrats rated him as higher in expertise 
than Republicans did, Wald=4.256, p=.039.  
We also had to take into account quote ratings in order to select the best quote/source 
pairs to choose for our main study. Although there were other “liberal” sources trusted more by 
Democrats than Republicans, Pope Francis’ and Stephen Hawking’s quotes were not 
significantly different from each other (mean difference= .12, p=.31). 
We chose Dean VanderLey as the high expertise “conservative” source because there was 
a marginal effect of political party such that Republicans trusted him more (M= 3.94, se=.191) 
than Democrats (M= 3.49, se=.126), Wald χ²= 3.085, p=.051. Both Democrats (M=3.48, 
se=.108) and Republicans (M=3.85, se=.172) ranked VanderLey as high in expertise, and there 
was not a significant difference between the parties, Wald χ²=3.326, p=.068. Although he was 
ranked significantly lower in expertise than Hawking (mean difference= .57, p<.001), the other 
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military sources ranked high in expertise were not differentially trusted by Republican vs. 
Democratic participants.   
Ben Van Buerden (the CEO of Shell) was chosen as the low expertise “conservative” 
source because Republicans trusted him significantly more (M=2.61, se= .21) than Democrats 
(M=2.01, se=.115), Wald χ²=6.119, p=.013. Both Democrats (M=2.83, se=.123) and Republicans 
(M=3.15, se=.215) gave him similarly low ratings of expertise, Wald χ²=1.729, p=.189). In 
addition, Buerden’s quote and Vanderley’s quote were also rated similarly to each other (mean 
difference= .07, p=.56) as indicated by pairwise comparisons. 
Discussion 
The majority of the trust rankings by participants went as expected. Sources that we 
predicted to match Republicans were rated higher in trustworthiness by Republicans, and sources 
predicted to match Democrats were rated higher in trustworthiness by Democrats. More 
specifically, for the most part, Republicans preferred military sources and the CEO. Democrats 
preferred scientists. However, there was one military source that was ranked about equal in 
trustworthiness between Republicans and Democrats, likely because he had his PhD. Also, 
surprisingly, Democrats perceived Pope Francis as significantly more trustworthy than 
Republicans did. 
There was also a larger correlation between persuasion and trustworthiness than we were 
expecting (r=.69). Participant political ideology influenced perceived expertise, particularly for 
scientists and military personnel. Although scientists tended to be seen as more expert than other 
sources overall, they were seen as more expert by Democrats than Republicans, as in prior 
research (Funk & Kennedy, 2016). Military sources, like Vanderley and Sullivan, also were rated 
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differently depending on ideology: military were rated as more expert by Republicans than 
Democrats.  
Based on the results of the GLM and mean ratings, we selected Dr. Steven Hawking as 
the high expertise “liberal” source, Pope Francis as the low expertise “liberal” source, Captain 
Dean VanderLey as the high expertise “conservative” source, and Shell CEO Ben Van Buerden 
as the low expertise “conservative” source. We found that Republicans consistently rated the 
quotes as less persuasive and worrying than Democrats did. However, we were able to find 
quotes that did not differ for sources who were more or less expert and more or less trusted by 
Republicans vs. Democrats.  
It was difficult to select ideal sources, so we were only able to select one per condition. 
Despite the issues with selecting source-quote pairs, we did find four satisfactory pairs to present 
to participants in the main study. 
 
Main Study 
After selecting the source-quote pairs, we continued with the main study. We presented each 
participant with one of four messages (high or low expertise and “conservative” or “liberal”) and 
measured climate change worry and environmental behavioral intentions. Our goal was to see if 
we could show that if a source matched a participant’s political ideology, they would be more 
persuaded by that particular source (H1b). We also wanted to see whether source ideology and 
expertise mattered more for high-knowledge participants (H2).   
Method 
Participants and design 
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The main study participants were recruited from the same cohort of Amazon Mturk participants 
who completed the October 2018 baseline, but did not participate in the pilot study. 1,000 people 
participated in the original cohort. Of them, 737 people were invited to participate in the political 
and scientific knowledge questionnaire, and 501 completed it. Those 501 participants were also 
asked to participate in the final study, and 386 did complete the study. Thus for the main study, 
386 participants were assigned to the cells of a 2 (source Expertise: high or low) × 2 (source 
party: “conservative” or “liberal”) between-participants design.  
Procedure 
As with the pilot study, participants completed a baseline questionnaire in October 2017, which 
included demographics (e.g., political party, age sex, income, education, etc.) and baseline 
climate change worry. In late January 2018, participants who had not completed the pilot study 
were given eight scientific and eight political knowledge questions to determine their level of 
knowledge on these topics. In late February 2018, participants who completed the knowledge 
questions were invited to the final portion of the study. Each participant was randomly presented 
with of the four source-quote pairs selected in the pilot test (see Appendix C), and rated their 
personal level of climate change worry, and their willingness to engage in environmentally-
friendly behaviors. 
Measures 
Political ideology. We measured political ideology in the baseline survey by asking participants 
to rate their political views on a scale of 1 (very liberal) to 5 (very conservative), and by asking 
them to select their political party affiliation (Republican, Democrat, Independent, undeclared, or 
other). Due to low recruitment and a higher-than-expected number of self-identified moderates in 
our sample, we used both political party and political orientation. Participants that reported 
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belonging to the Democratic party or being politically liberal were coded as liberal (1); 
participants reported belonging to the Republican party or being politically conservative were 
coded as conservative (3). Only those participants who reported being moderate and not 
belonging to a political party were coded as moderate (2). Three participants who said they were 
liberal Republicans were not included in analyses. 
Science and political knowledge. In a separate survey, participants answered eight scientific and 
eight political knowledge questions (Appendix B). The science questions were taken from The 
National Science Board (2010) and included multiple choice and true or false questions. The 
political knowledge questions were modeled after prior research (Bolsen & Druckman 2016) and 
included fill in the blank and multiple choice questions. Following Bolsen and Druckman (2016), 
political and scientific knowledge were combined into a single knowledge index (Cronbach’s 
=.64). 
Climate change worry. At baseline and again after the persuasive message, participants were 
asked three questions regarding their environmental and economic worry, two of which formed 
the measure of climate change worry. Specifically, participants were asked “How much do you 
worry about the environment?” and “How much do you worry about the economy?” and 
responded on scales from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a great deal). They then reported whether they 
found it more important to protect the environment or the economy from 1 (definitely protect the 
environment) to 5 (definitely protect the economy), which was reverse-scored so that higher 
scores indicated greater environmental worry. The question about the economy was not included 
in the climate change index. The two environmental questions were highly correlated (rBaseline 
=.68, p<.001, rpost test =.63, p<.001) and were averaged to form a climate change worry index.  
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Behavioral intentions. Participants were asked their willingness of completing eight 
environmentally-friendly behaviors (i.e., eat less beef, car pool, sign a petition, donate, ride a 
bike or walk, volunteer, contact local representative, or use reusable bags) on 5-point scales  
(1=definitely yes, 5= definitely not). These measures were highly correlated (Cronbach’s =.87) 
and were averaged to form an index of behavioral intentions. 
 
Results 
To test H1b (sources that match a participant’s party identification will be more 
persuasive), we conducted a general linear model regressing post-test environmental worry on 
source expertise, source ideology, and participant ideology including all main effects and 
interactions. We found only a main effect of participant ideology: liberals had the highest worry 
(M=4.53, se=.07), followed by moderates (M=3.82, se=.13), and then conservatives (M=2.99, 
se=.11), Wald χ²(2)=136.13, p<.001. The main effects of the source variables, and their 
interactions with each other and participant ideology were not significant p>.30. H1b was not 
supported. 
To test H2 (Knowledge and political ideology will interact such that high knowledge 
Republicans will show the greatest effect of a matching message source), we added knowledge 
and its interactions with political ideology to the H1b model. We then deleted nonsignificant 
effects one at a time, starting with the higher order interactions, and rerunning the model after 
each deletion. We found that ideology was related to post environmental worry, in that 
conservatives worried less, Wald χ²(2)=13.12, p=.001. Knowledge was not significantly related 
to post environmental worry, Wald χ²(1)=1.23, p=.27  We were left with an interaction of 
knowledge and ideology, Wald χ²(2)=27.67, p<.001. To examine the interaction, we coded 
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ideology as (1=liberal, 0=moderate, -1=conservative) and mean-centered knowledge to aid in 
interpretation and graphed using PROCESS. The analysis showed that the effect of ideology was 
stronger when knowledge was high (b=−1.05, se=.09, t(1)=−11.83, p<.001)  than low (b=−.42, 
se=.10, t(1)=−4.41, p<.001). See Figure 4. H2 was not supported. 
 Even though we did not find the expected effects for environmental worry, we examined 
behavioral intentions in case the predicted effects of source and participant ideology emerged for 
behavioral intentions. The results were nearly identical to those for post-test worry, which is not 
surprising given the high correlation between worry and behavioral intentions (r=.68). All of the 
interactions for behavioral intentions involving source effects were p>.20. We also found an 
interaction (Wald χ²(2)=16.4, p<.001) between ideology and knowledge; PROCESS analyses 
revealed that the effect of ideology was stronger when knowledge was high (b=.69, se=.07, 
t(1)=9.90, p<.001) than low (b=.29, se=.08, t(1)=3.88, p=.001). The GLM also showed an effect 
of ideology such that liberals scored higher for behavioral intentions than conservatives (Wald 
χ²(2)=6.45, p=.04), but no effect of knowledge (Wald χ²(1)=.335, p=.55).  
No significant effects on change in worry (p<.05) emerged; the baseline and post-test 
worry were highly correlated (r=.83). Participant ideology and knowledge strongly predicted 
baseline environmental worry as well, so there was no change in worry.  
 
Discussion 
Although we found sources that were differentially trusted by Republicans and 
Democrats and were high or low in expertise in our pilot study, the chosen messages and sources 
did not seem influence our outcome variables. We did not find support for either H1b or H2 in 
our study: our manipulation of source ideology and expertise did not influence climate change 
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worry or climate-related behavioral intentions. However, and consistent with previous research 
(e.g., Shoots-Reinhard, Petty, DeMarree, & Rucker, 2015; Drummond & Fischhhoff, 2015; 
Kahan et al., 2012), we found that knowledge and ideology influenced perceptions of and worry 
about climate change: the more participants knew about science and politics, the larger the effect 
of ideology on climate change worry and behavioral intentions. Specifically, high knowledge 
Democrats worried the most about climate change, and were more willing to behave sustainably, 
whereas high knowledge Republicans were less likely to believe in climate change, and less 
likely to behave sustainably. Similar to our findings, Drummond & Fischhoff (2015) found that 
more polarization occurred when the participants had more scientific knowledge. They also 
found that climate change was one of the topics they researched that resulted in more 
polarization depending on political identity (Drummond & Fisschoff, 2015).  Kahan et al. (2012) 
also found that those who were high in scientific knowledge were not the most concerned about 
climate change. In fact, they found that they were the ones who polarized the most on the topic 
of climate change. They concluded that the lack of concern for climate change was not due to a 
lack of knowledge, but due to the fact that people wanted stay within their ingroup (Kahan et al., 
2012). 
There are a number of reasons why we did not find our predicted source effects. First, 
climate change attitudes are hard to change. Indeed, we found that climate change worry 
measurements from four months apart were extremely highly correlated. Stability is one of the 
hallmarks of attitude strength, and resistance to change is one of its consequences (Krosnick & 
Petty, 1995). Other researchers have found that climate change attitudes are difficult to change, 
particularly for knowledgeable people (Bolsen & Druckman 2016; Kahan, 2013).  
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Second, our sample was fairly highly knowledgeable; the mean score exceeded 13 points 
on a 16-point scale, and 14.8% of participants had perfect scores. It is possible that our sample 
was so high in knowledge that they were resistant to any attempts to change their attitudes. For 
example, highly knowledgeable conservatives may be able to call to mind many other 
conservative experts that dispute climate scientists. This would make our message only one of 
many that they can recall, reducing its impact. 
It is possible that by choosing quotes about climate change rather than messages about 
the scientific consensus on climate change like Bolsen and Druckman (2016) and van der 
Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, and Maibach, (2015, 2014), we changed too much from prior 
research. For example, van der Linden and colleagues used the statement “97% of climate 
scientists have concluded that climate change is happening”, (see Appendix A for statements we 
used). However, the one quote we had that mentioned scientific consensus (i.e., Lonnie 
Thompson’s) was not particularly highly rated overall or for Republicans, and prior research 
(Funk & Kennedy, 2016) has shown Republicans distrust scientists. It is also possible that our 
messages were too complicated, unlike the simple messages used by van der Linden et al (2014). 
However, given the high knowledge of our participants, that explanation seemed unlikely. In 
addition, enough variation in knowledge existed to find an interaction of ideology and 
knowledge consistent with prior research. 
Finally, we expected to find source effects to be larger for conservative participants, but 
we had only a small number of conservatives in our sample, which could have reduced our 
chances of finding effects. However, we did find effects consistent with prior research (i.e., the 
interaction of ideology and political and political knowledge). Neveretheless, effects may have 
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been detected had we reached our target sample size of 600 participants or been able to recruit 
more conservatives.  
Future research could benefit from recruiting a larger, more diverse sample (i.e., more 
conservatives and fewer knowledgeable people), and by using more messages. For example, if 
each participant had been presented with four messages rather than one, it may have helped 
persuade them, particularly for high expertise and politically matched sources presented to 
knowledgeable Republicans.  
Conclusions  
We found that giving people persuasive messages about climate change from high 
expertise sources that matches their political ideology did not change their attitudes on climate 
change. We found no effects of our manipulations of source expertise and political ideology 
match on climate change worry or environmentally friendly behavioral intentions. Instead, we 
found that political ideology and a combined measure of scientific and political knowledge 
interacted to predict these outcomes, such that ideology effects on outcomes were stronger when 
knowledge was high. Overall, this study has shown us that attitudes surrounding climate change 
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Figure 1: Average ratings of quotes (rated perceived persuasiveness and climate change worry) 
for Republicans and Democrats. Higher numbers equal greater persuasion and worry. 
Figure 2: Average ratings of perceived trust of source for Republicans and Democrats. Higher 
numbers equal greater trust. 
Figure 3: Average ratings of perceived expertise for Republicans and Democrats. Higher 
numbers equal greater perceived expertise.  
Figure 4. Interaction of participant political ideology and knowledge (political and scientific) on 
post-message climate change worry. Political knowledge is ±1 standard deviation; political 




Figure 1. Average ratings of quotes (rated perceived persuasiveness and climate change 




































Figure 2. Average ratings of perceived trust of source for Republicans and Democrats. 




































Figure 3. Average ratings of perceived expertise for Republicans and Democrats. Higher 



































Figure 4. Interaction of participant political ideology and knowledge (political and 
scientific) on post-message climate change worry. Political knowledge is ±1 standard 































Table 1. Quote and source ratings from pilot study for all 11 pilot-tested messages. Ratings across Republicans and Democrats (i.e., 
overall) are presented first, followed by ratings for Republicans (R) and Democrats (D), separately. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance test is for the difference between Republicans and Democrats. Source biographies and quotes were presented to 
participants separately.  
 average quote rating 
 
average expertise average trustworthiness 















































































































































































































































































Table 2. Descriptive statistics for main study measures. 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Cronbach’s α 
Baseline Climate 
Worry 
379 1.00 5.50 3.82 1.28 .68 
Knowledge  379 5.00 16.00 13.26 2.23 .64 
Posttest Climate 
Worry 
379 1.00 5.50 4.01 1.25 .53 






Captain Dean VanderLey 
 
Captain Dean VanderLey attended Stanford 
University and has his Master’ in Civil and 
Environmental Engineering.  He is currently the 
Commanding Officer of the NAVFAC Mid-
Atlantic.   
 
“We see the rising sea levels and flooding 
events...We have a responsibility to prepare for the 
future. We don’t have the luxury of just burying 




Admiral Titley attended the Naval Postgraduate School and 
received his  Master of Science degree in Meteorology and 
Physical Oceanography and a Doctorate in Meteorology.  Admiral 
Titley served more than 10 years at sea.  He was the 
oceanographer and and navigator of the navy in 2009.  In 2012 he 
became the acting assistant deputy chief of Naval Operations for 
Information Dominance.  He is currently retired and is a professor 
at Pennsylvania State University.  
 
 
“There will be a discrete event or series of events that will change 
the calculus. I don’t know who, I don’t know how violent.  




















Pope Francis was ordained a Catholic Priest in 1969, and he 
became the Archbishop of Buenos Aires in 1998.  In 2001, he 
was elected cardinal by Pope John Paul II.  His papacy began in 
2013. 
 
“The monopolising of lands, deforestation, the appropriation of 
water, inadequate agro-toxics are some of the evils that tear man 
from the land of his birth. Climate change, the loss of biodiversity 
and deforestation are already showing their devastating effects in 








General Gordan Sullivan 
 
 General Sullivan retired from the Army on July 31, 1995, 
after more than 36 years of active  
service.  He culminated his uniformed service as the 32nd 
Chief of Staff—the Army’s senior general officer—and a 
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
 
“People are saying they want to be perfectly convinced 
about climate science projections…But speaking as a 
soldier, we never have 100 percent certainty. If you wait 
until you have 100 percent certainty, something bad is 


















Ben van Beurden 
“We recognise the significance of 
climate change, along with the 
role energy plays in helping 
people achieve and maintain a 
good quality of life. A key role 
for society – and for Shell – is to 
find ways to provide much more 
energy with less carbon dioxide.”  
Beurden has worked for Shell 
since 1983, after graduating with 
his master’s degree in chemical 
engineering.  He has worked in 
the Netherlands, Malaysia, the 





Although famous for his role in multiple 
well-known movies, he is also an 
environmental activist.  He wrote and 
produced an environmental documentary 
called The 11th Hour. He's served on the 
boards of the World Wildlife Fund, the 
Natural Resources Defense Council and the 
International Fund for Animal Welfare. 
 
 
“We are now experiencing what can only 
be called a planetary crisis — a 
convergence of accelerating climate 
change, unprecedented loss of biodiversity, 
and increasing human health issues caused 









Neil Degrasse Tyson 
 
Tyson earned his BA from Harvard University and his PhD in Astrophysics from Columbia.  In 
2001  
, he was appointed by President Bush to study the 
future of US Aerospace Engineering.  He was 
appointed again in 2004 on the implementation of the 
United States Space Exploration Policy. 
 “We're dumping carbon dioxide into the atmosphere 
at a rate the Earth hasn't seen since the great climate 
catastrophes of the past, the ones that led to mass 
extinctions. We just can't seem to break our addiction 
to the kinds of fuel that will bring back a climate last seen by the dinosaurs, a climate that will 
drown our coastal cities and wreak havoc on the environment and our ability to feed ourselves. 
...The dinosaurs never saw that asteroid coming. What's our excuse?” 
 
Lonnie G. Thompson 
 
Lonnie G. Thompson is a Distinguished 
University Professor in the School of Earth 
Sciences and a Senior Research Scientist in 
the Byrd Polar Research Center at The 
Ohio State University.  His research has 
propelled the field of ice core 
paleoclimatology out of the Polar Regions 
to the highest tropical and subtropical ice 
fields. He has spent months studying ice 
cores at elevation over 5,500 meters. 
 
 “Why then are climatologists speaking out 
about the dangers of global warming? The answer is that virtually all of us are now convinced 















Dr. John Gribbin 
 
 
John Gribbin earned 
his PhD in 
astrophysics from 
the University of 
Cambridge in 1971. 
He is a British 
science writer and is 
a fellow in 
astronomy at the 
University of 
Sussex.  He wrote 
In Search of 
Schrodinger's Cat, a 
famous book on 
quantum theory. 
 
 “By the end of the next century, the “greenhouse effect” may increase temperatures worldwide 
to levels that have not been reached for at least 100,000 years. And the effects on sea level and 
on agriculture and other human activities are likely to be so profound that we should be planning 




Bill Nye earned his Bachelor’s 
degree in mechanical engineering 
from Cornell University. He is 
known for his time on an 
educational children’s series called 
“Bill Nye the Science Guy”.  
“You can’t choose to believe in 
gravity; if you walk off a cliff, you 
will be affected adversely. Climate 
change is not a 50-50 thing which 
you can choose to believe in or not. 
If you choose to ignore human’s influence on the world’s climate, we will be affected 








Professor Hawking is an English 
theoretical physicist, cosmologist, author 
and Director of Research at the Centre 
for Theoretical Cosmology within the 
University of Cambridge. He was the 
Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at 
the University of Cambridge between 
1979 and 2009 and has achieved 
commercial success with works of 
popular science in which he discusses 
his own theories and cosmology in 
general; his book A Brief History of 
Time.   
“The danger is that global warming may 
become self-sustaining, if it has not done 
so already. The melting of the Arctic and Antarctic ice caps reduces the fraction of solar energy 
reflected back into space, and so increases the temperature further. Climate change may kill off 
the Amazon and other rain forests, and so eliminate once one of the main ways in which carbon 
dioxide is removed from the atmosphere. The rise in sea temperature may trigger the release of 
large quantities of carbon dioxide, trapped as hydrides on the ocean floor. Both these phenomena 
would increase the greenhouse effect, and so global warming further. We have to reverse global 



























The center of the earth is very hot:  True/False 
All radioactivity is man-made: True/False 
Lasers work by focusing sound waves: True/False 
Electrons are smaller than atoms – True/False 
Which is correct?A.The Earth goes around the Sun, B. The Sun goes around the Earth 
It is the father’s gene that decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl True/False 
Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria True/False 
Which party is more conservative is the US? Republican/Democrat 
Whose responsibility is it to declare a law unconstitutional? Supreme Court 
Who is the current Vice President? Michael Pence 
Who is the current speaker of the House of Representatives? Paul Ryan 
Who is the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court? John Roberts 






High-expertise liberal source 
 
Low-expertise liberal source
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High-expertise conservative source
 
Low-expertise conservative source
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
